We examine the risk consequences of the S-corporation election, a tax
I. INTRODUCTION
T he role of regulation and incentives in monitoring firm risk is a central theme in economics and accounting research (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . 1 In this study, we examine whether the organizational restrictions of S-corporation status, the most prominent tax-motivated organizational form, influences risk-taking behaviors relative to C-corporations. We exploit the commercial bank setting to investigate our research question because extensive regulation to mitigate excessive risk-taking and protect depositors is a prominent feature of the U.S. and international banking system (Beatty and Liao, 2014) . Despite such extensive regulation, according to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) hundreds of banks failed from 2008 through 2010, generating billions of dollars in losses borne by government agencies and U.S. taxpayers (Sidel, 2011) .
2 During this time period the media focused primarily on the collapse and bailout of the larger financial institutions (Fitzpatrick and Sidel, 2010; Sidel, 2011; Mollenkamp, Lucchetti, and Ng, 2011) ; however, approximately 86 percent of the failures were private commercial banks with total assets of no more than $1 billion dollars. 3 This private segment of the banking industry includes C-corporations for which corporate profits are taxed twice, and S-corporations, a tax-motivated organizational form in which corporate profits are taxed only at the shareholder level. 4 Unlike prior work that examines how tax avoidance amplifies total firm risk by increasing the dispersion of future tax outcomes (Guenther, Matsunaga, and Williams, 2013; Hutchens and Rego, 2013) , in our setting, uncertainty in tax minimization is held constant. That is, S-corporations generally pay no corporate federal income tax as long as they satisfy the statutory criteria. These criteria include organizational restrictions on the number and type of shareholders that an S-corporation can have (discussed in detail later). We study whether these S-corporation organizational restrictions influence risk-taking by potentially constraining access to external capital (e.g., especially from corporate investors with large capital bases that would allow them to provide critical capital during periods of bank distress).
The theoretical relation between bank regulatory capital requirements and risk-taking is multi-faceted. Capital requirements curb excessive risk-taking by inducing banks only to assume risk for which they have access to a capital buffer that allows them to satisfy regulatory criteria if risky investments fail (Stulz, 2014) . However, Stulz also notes that these requirements can constrain banks' ability to exploit investment opportunities that enhance firm value, which leads to a tradeoff between capital requirements and risktaking among banks because capital requirements implicitly impose barriers to risk that banks would otherwise seek. We conjecture that the S-corporation organizational form magnifies the dampening effect of regulatory capital requirements on banks' risk-taking activities by imposing significant limitations on external capital sources. Managers of S-corporation banks know, upon election into S-corporation status, that the bank's access to capital will be relatively limited because of the accompanying organizational restrictions imposed on banks to qualify for S-corporation status. The flow through nature of S-corporation federal taxation should also increase shareholders' proximity and sensitivity to the bank's performance and thus, establishes a more rigorous monitoring system. Accordingly, we argue that managers of S-corporation banks will limit their risk-taking in comparison to C-corporation banks.
Conversely, there are plausible reasons to expect that tax-motivated choice of organizational form will have little effect on firms' risk-taking behaviors. First, S-corporation banks generally keep a larger portion of their pretax earnings given the lack of an entitylevel federal income tax. Internally-generated capital could serve as a substitute for capital shortfalls due to the organizational restrictions limiting S-corporations' access to external capital. Further, extensive regulation and monitoring apply broadly to commercial banks, regardless of organizational form, such that S-corporation status may have little incremental effect on deterring risk-taking. In addition, Congress intended S-corporation banks to use tax savings to increase lending and create jobs (P.L. 104-188). To the degree that S-corporations use tax savings to make riskier investment decisions than they might otherwise pursue, S-corporation status might induce risk-taking. Consequently, whether the choice of a tax-motivated organizational form is associated with greater firm risk-taking is an open empirical question.
The role of regulation in monitoring firm risk lies at the intersection of tax policy, public economics, and industrial organization. From a tax policy perspective, S-corporations are the most common business entity in the United States, representing about 60 percent of all corporate returns (Luttrell, 2006) and accounting for roughly one-third of community banks (FDIC, 2012) ; however, technical tax provisions prevent many banks from converting their organizational form. This study highlights how potentially overlooked features of tax regulation may impact risk-taking and extreme adverse outcomes such as large losses and bank failures, which is important given independent government reports indicating that bank regulators do not employ differing standards to assess the performance and viability of S-versus C-corporation banks (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2000) .
From an organizational perspective, this study provides insights on the risk consequences of tax-motivated organizational form choices that provide relatively certain tax minimization strategies. While prior research often emphasizes the effect of organizational structures (dual-class ownership, private equity, and family ownership) on tax avoidance outcomes (Badertscher, Katz, and Rego, 2013; Chen et al. 2010; McGuire, Wang, and Wilson, 2014) , we consider outcomes that flow from the most common taxmotivated corporate organizational form. Our results suggest that although S-corporation banks, on average, were associated with less risk-taking, they were equally likely to fail during the recent financial crisis. Finally from an investor perspective, we contribute to the literature examining the role of taxes in firms' capital and operating decisions (e.g., Collins, Shackelford, and Wahlen, 1995; Petroni and Shackelford, 1995; Gallemore, 2013) by highlighting how tax-motivated organizational form is related to heterogeneity in banks' ability to raise capital, which influences firm risk-taking behaviors.
We conduct our analyses using a sample of privately-held commercial banks over a period from 2001 to 2009 and employ a difference-in-differences methodology to test our hypothesis. This model allows us to use banks as their own controls and compare firm-specific changes in risk behaviors before and after the conversion to the S-corporation organizational form. We use straightforward proxies of firm risk that reflect dispersion in possible payoffs (e.g., standard deviations of pre-tax profitability and net interest, and Z-score) that are widely used in the literature (e.g., Jin, Kanagaretnam, and Lobo, 2013; Bushman, Hendricks, and Williams, 2014) . 5 Our results provide evidence that, upon conversion, banks that elect S-corporation status engage in significantly less risk-taking than banks that operate as C-corporations and do not convert. These findings are consistent with bank managers intentionally curbing risk-taking upon conversion to an S-corporation, suggesting that limited access to capital and increased shareholder monitoring reduce risk-taking.
To further investigate S-corporation organizational form and risk-taking, we examine whether this difference in risk-taking leads to differences in extreme adverse outcomes in the form of large losses, large loan loss provisions, and bank failure during the recent financial crisis. We find that S-corporation banks are significantly less likely to have large losses and large loan loss provisions relative to C-corporation banks. However, we do not find evidence that S-corporation banks are more or less likely to experience bank failure compared to C-corporation banks. Interestingly, in supplemental tests, we provide evidence that S-corporations hold less capital and issue less equity for a given level of risk, compared to C-corporation banks, which is consistent with our argument that the organizational restrictions of S-corporations alter banks' risk appetites by imposing relatively greater capital constraints. Taken together, the evidence presented in this paper indicates that the organizational restrictions of S-corporation status curbs risk-taking behaviors; however, this additional restraint in risk-taking did not enable S-corporation banks to better withstand the financial crisis.
II. S-CORPORATION ORGANIZATIONAL FORM AND RISK-TAKING
Prior work considers the role of taxes in firm risk-taking from different perspectives. Domar and Musgrave (1944) suggest that firm risk is positively related to tax rates. Langenmayr and Lester (2015) examine the role of jurisdictional tax loss recovery rules on risky firm investment and find evidence of a positive association between firm risk-taking and the length of tax loss recovery periods depending on firms' expectations of recovering tax losses. 6 These studies suggest that tax savings incentives likely influence firm risk-taking activities. We study the effect of tax-motivated choices of organizational form on firm risk-taking behavior and consider organizational criteria that provide significant federal income tax savings, but potentially constrain banks' access to capital. S-corporations are legally-incorporated firms that qualify for, and elect to be treated as, an S-corporation for federal tax purposes. Importantly, apart from taxrelated advantages and organizational restrictions, S-corporations are legally identical to C-corporation entities in all non-tax aspects. C-corporation banks and S-corporation banks are also subject to the same bright line regulatory capital thresholds.
7 Indeed, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2000) reports that banking regulators do not employ different standards to assess the performance and viability of S-corporation and C-corporation banks.
Nevertheless, access to capital and shareholder monitoring mechanisms are unique S-corporation features that are likely associated with less bank risk-taking by S-corporation banks compared to C-corporation banks. Because banks play a central role in the broader economy and excessive bank risk-taking poses significant spillover effects for the broader economy (Stulz, 2014) , regulators impose precise and rigid capital requirements on banks. The adverse consequences for failing to satisfy these requirements are severe and may ultimately lead to bank failure. Thus, access to capital is an important factor influencing a bank's risk appetite. Stulz (2014) discusses the importance of risk capital, or as Matten (2000, pp. 24-25) states "the amount of capital the bank requires to support the risks it takes so that as a whole its level of risk meets its risk appetite." As banks increase risk-taking activities, they can balance their risk by obtaining more equity capital (Stulz, 2014) .
In order to qualify for the single-level of taxation available via S-corporation status, tax law imposes specific requirements on S-corporations that potentially limit access to external capital in three significant ways. First, tax law permits S-corporation banks to have no more than 100 shareholders, which constrains the size of the shareholder base. Second, tax provisions restrict the type of shareholder that can own S-corporation stock: each S-corporation shareholder must either be an individual, an estate, or a specific type of trust or tax-exempt organization. In particular, C-corporations and partnerships may not own any portion of S-corporation stock, which constrains S-corporations' access to many institutions with large capital bases that can invest capital during periods of distress. Finally, S-corporations are permitted to have only one class of stock, 8 which potentially deters current shareholders from issuing new equity that could dilute their control and distribution rights. In summary, the FDIC (2012, Chapter 6, pp. 4) notes that "because Subchapter S status includes restriction on the number and type of shareholders, banks organized as S corporations may be limited in their ability to raise capital from new investors."
On the other hand, tax provisions provide S-corporations with a comparative advantage in their ability to retain internally-generated capital. In particular, S-corporations do not pay an entity-level tax and thus, pre-tax income maps into bank regulatory capital for S-corporations at a higher rate relative to C-corporations. For instance, pre-tax earnings map into bank regulatory capital at a rate of 1:1 for S-corporations, but only at a rate of 1:(1 -t ) for C-corporations, where t reflects the C-corporation bank's marginal corporate tax rate.
9 Although S-corporations typically distribute relatively more dividends to shareholders to help them satisfy tax obligations on their flow-through income, holding all else constant, S-corporations enjoy a significant advantage relative to C-corporations in the form of a higher mapping of pre-tax earnings dollars into regulatory capital.
10 Given that S-corporations have external capital constraints, but internal capital advantages compared to C-corporations, it is unclear a priori whether risk capital considerations will be associated with S-corporations exhibiting more or less risk-taking compared to C-corporations.
Potential differences in shareholder monitoring efforts represent an additional area that could give rise to differences in S-corporation and C-corporation risk-taking. Like other firms in the economy, banks incur agency costs inherent in separation of ownership and corporate control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Because the effects of performance directly flow through to their individual tax returns each year, shareholders often rely on dividends to satisfy their individual tax liabilities related to bank income. This reporting mechanism implicitly establishes a more rigorous monitoring system by increasing the relative benefits of monitoring and increasing shareholders' proximity and sensitivity to the bank's performance. Consistent with evidence in other settings that suggests that investor proximity and access to information enhances external monitoring efforts (Ayers, Ramalingegowda, and Yeung, 2011) , we posit that S-corporation shareholders' proximity to the bank's performance improves monitoring of S-corporation banks. Yet, how such monitoring is likely to affect risk-taking is unclear. On one hand, increased monitoring efforts potentially constrain bank risk-taking by inhibiting managers from pursuing excessively risky projects. Alternatively, because risk potentially enhances shareholder value, increased shareholder involvement may induce shareholders to encourage risk-taking. Given the offsetting effects associated with the tax advantages and organizational restrictions of the S-corporation organizational form, it is unclear whether risk-taking of S-corporation banks will differ from risk-taking of C-corporations. Thus, we formalize our hypothesis in null form as H1: The S-corporation organizational form is not associated with risk-taking.
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Our sample of privately-held commercial banks offers several advantages in examining our research question. First, it allows us to examine an organizational form that is a function of tax preferences, while eliminating competing explanations associated with differences in limited liability or capital market incentives. Second, the banking industry reflects a relatively homogenous group of firms with respect to claims and liabilities (Beaver, McAnally, and Stinson, 1997) , which is important given our examination of risk-taking associated with restrictions due to organizational form.
A. Risk-Taking Sample Selection
We collect data on all private commercial banks from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's dataset of Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) filed with the Federal Reserve or Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation between 1997 and 2013 (142,431 observations). 11 We begin in 1997 as this is the first year banks became eligible for the S-corporation organizational form and end in 2013 due to data availability. Because we require five years of future information to calculate our forward-looking risk measures, we then remove observations from 2009-2013 (112,868 observations) . Note that we continue to use data from 2009-2013 for our forward-looking risk measures. We next require all observations to have the necessary information to calculate all variables in the risk-taking regression defined as (1) below (99,404 observations). Lastly, given our difference-in-differences design, we only retain banks that are always C-corporations or are C-corporations that convert to S-corporations. Accordingly, we remove all banks that are originally chartered as an S-corporation (i.e., de novo banks) as no pre-conversion control observation exists for these banks.
12 Our final sample consists of 90,322 bank-year observations, with 64,811 observations representing banks that are always C-corporations, 10,817 observations representing C-corporation banks before electing S-corporation status, and 14,694 S-corporation observations. We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. 
B. Risk-Taking Methodology
For our primary analysis, we adapt the empirical strategy of Jin, Kanagaretnam, and Lobo (2013) into a difference-in-differences research design as is typical in the economics literature (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003) . A difference-in-differences analysis allows us to use S-corporations' risk-taking behavior prior to conversion as a control for bank-specific risk-taking incentives that are constant over time. In addition, the design allows us to use C-corporation banks that never convert to control for any common trends affecting all banks (Roberts and Whited, 2013 Jin, Kanagaretnam, and Lobo (2013) . First, σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of pretax return on assets from years t through t + 4. Second, σ (Net Interest) is the standard deviation of net interest margin from years t through t + 4 where net interest margin equals the difference between interest income and interest expense, scaled by total assets. Third, ZScore is calculated as a firm's pretax income plus Tier 1 capital divided by total assets. We then scale this value by the standard deviation of pretax return on assets from years t through t + 4 and multiply by negative one so that ZScore, like σ (ROA) and σ (Net Interest), is increasing in risk.
The indicator variable SBank equals one for any bank that employs the S-corporation organizational form at any point during our sample period. Therefore, the coefficient on SBank captures the average risk-taking behavior of S-corporations over the entire sample period including before conversion. Our variable of interest is PostS, an indicator equaling one for banks that have converted to S-corporations during the sample period. To the extent S-corporation banks engage in less (more) risk-taking behavior compared to C-corporation banks, we expect a negative (positive) and significant coefficient on PostS. That is, a negative coefficient on PostS is consistent with conversion into the S-corporation organizational form being associated with less risk-taking behavior, whereas a positive coefficient would indicate that S-corporation banks exhibit more risk-taking behavior after conversion. We note that PostS captures the risk-taking behavior of S-corporation banks incremental to C-corporation banks and controlling for the S-corporations' own risk-taking behavior prior to conversion.
We include several control variables based on prior literature (Jin, Kanagaretnam, and Lobo, 2013; Bushman, Hendricks, and Williams, 2014) . We control for size (Size), measured as the natural log of assets, as larger banks arguably have greater resources to invest in risk-management and different information environments in which shareholders monitor bank activities. We control for performance by including the difference between interest income and interest expense scaled by assets (INTSpread), the ratio of nonperforming loans to net loans and leases (NPL), and the ratio of the loan loss provision to net loans and leases (LLP). Net loans and leases equal total loans and leases less the loan loss reserve at the end of the year. Banks experiencing tremendous growth may have insufficient control systems in place to appropriately manage the growth (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013). Accordingly, we include the percentage change in total loans (Growth). We control for banks' capital structure because banks with higher levels of leverage (measured by Lev) are likely to be more risk-averse and better capitalized banks (measured by Tier1) should be better able to accommodate the risk of loss without fear of regulatory intervention due to low capital levels (Berger and Bouwman, 2013) . Leverage is defined as the ratio of non-deposit liabilities to total assets. Tier1 is the bank's Tier 1 capital ratio. 13 Because risk of default varies by loan type (U.S. Government Accountibility Office, 2013), we control for the percentage of a bank's loan portfolio in each category (measured by RealEstate, Consumer, and Commercial). In addition, because S-corporation banks are not randomly distributed geographically (Donohoe, Lisowsky, and Mayberry, 2015) and bank risk varies by geographic region (Gallemore, 2013) , we include indicator variables representing the U.S. Census regions. Finally, to control for time-series and cross-sectional dependency, we include year fixed effects and cluster standard errors by bank (Petersen, 2009 ).
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C. Sample Selection for Extreme Adverse Outcomes Analyses
We investigate the extent to which S-corporation banks are differentially likely to become troubled during the financial crisis using a subset of our risk-taking sample, defined previously. We begin with all banks in the year 2006 (8,172 observations) as this is the year immediately preceding the year in which the financial crisis is generally believed to have begun (Jin, Kanagaretnam, and Lobo, 2013; Ryan, 2008; Erkens, Hung, and Matos, 2012) . We require each bank to either have five years of data or to experience a failure in the time period (6,986 observations). We then remove 157 observations associated with conversions into S-corporation status and 15 observations associated with revocations of S-corporation status (6,730 observations). Finally, we impose additional constraints for new control variables included in this analysis, resulting in our final sample of 5,811 observations.
D. Methodology for Extreme Adverse Outcomes Analyses
The S-corporation election is an inherent endogeneity concern in our setting because banks deliberately elect S-corporation status. In our risk-taking analysis, we control for this endogeneity using a difference-in-differences design. In our troubled bank analysis, we accommodate self-selection with a bivariate probit system of equations that simultaneously estimates the probability of a bank being an S-corporation, the probability of a bank being troubled, and the probability of the S-corporation election impacting the likelihood of being troubled (Mallar, 1977) . 15 We estimate the following probit regression selection model We draw on the prior work of Hodder, McAnally, and Weaver (2003) in specifying (2).
16 SBank 06 is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank has elected Subchapter S status as of 2006. In addition to the variables we later use in (3) to control for the probability of becoming troubled, we also include three variables in (2) from Hodder, McAnally, and Weaver (2003) as exclusion restrictions (Maddala, 1983) . First, Dividends equals the ratio of dividends to assets. As dividends are generally tax-exempt for S-corporation shareholders, we expect banks that pay more dividends to be more likely to be S-corporations. Second, Built-inGain is the appreciation in available-for-sale securities, scaled by assets (where appreciation is the difference between fair value and historical cost). Given that S-corporations may face an additional tax on the appreciation of its assets subsequent to conversion, we expect banks facing greater built-in gains to be less likely to be S-corporations (Omer, Plesko, and Shelley, 2000) . 17 Third, AMT equals the sum of tax exempt loans, leases, and securities scaled by assets. Given that 15 Lennox, Francis, and Wang (2012) and Tucker (2010) note that the appropriate approach to selection concerns depends upon the nature of the underlying selection problem, including whether selection occurs on observable or unobservable attributes. In our setting, we are unable to observe the full set of determinants of S-corporation election. For example, Hodder, McAnally, and Weaver (2003) note that bank managers are hesitant to convert to S-corporation status when such a conversion would unduly affect their regulatory capital due to deferred tax asset write-downs. We are not able to observe managers' estimates of what an S-corporation's counterfactual deferred tax assets would have been had no conversion occurred. The bivariate probit system of equations is most appropriate for our setting because we are examining the relation between S-corporation organizational form, a choice variable, and a dichotomous outcome, bank failure. We thank Jenny Tucker and William Greene for helpful insights on using the bivariate probit system of equations technique in our setting. 16 Hodder, McAnally, and Weaver (2003) model the initial conversion decision going from the C-corporation organizational form to S-corporation immediately following legislative changes that permitted banks to be S-corporations for the first time. Although many of the variables in the Hodder, McAnally, and Weaver (2003) model are appropriate for our tests, in which we are modeling the probability of an S-election after conversion has occurred, some of the variables in Hodder, McAnally, and Weaver (2003) do not apply to our setting. For example, we do not include a measure of taxable income, tax loss carry forwards, or deferred tax asset write-offs because the S-corporation banks in our model do not have corporate taxable income, tax loss carry forwards, or deferred tax assets because we observe them after conversion rather than before. Similarly, we do not include state-specific S-corporation tax benefits because such benefits vary over time and may have been different at the time of conversion compared to the relevant period for our tests. 17 Because the built-in gain tax only applies to the initial 10 years following conversion, this variable imperfectly reflects the additional built-in gains tax that S-corporations face for S-corporation bank observations more than 10 years after the S-corporation conversion. However, it is important to note that banks could not convert to S-corporation status until 1997 and that we benchmark our extreme adverse outcome sample as of 2006. Thus, the likelihood of an S-corporation election being greater than 10 years old is negligible.
S-corporations are not subject to the corporate alternative minimum tax (AMT), we expect banks facing greater potential AMT burdens to be more likely to elect S-corporation status. It is important to note that while we expect Dividends, Built-inGain, and AMT to influence the decision to be an S-corporation, there are no theoretical predictions linking these variables to a bank becoming troubled or failing (Lennox, Francis, and Wang, 2012) . We estimate our second probit model, the outcome model, based on Jin, Kanagaretnam, and Lobo (2013) (2013), we define a large loss (large loan loss provision) as any loss (loan loss provision) that is greater than 5 percent (4 percent) of assets. By failure, we mean the FDIC taking possession of a bank. While bank failure is arguably the most costly of our outcome variables, representing loss suffered by shareholders and taxpayers, it also involves a nontrivial level of regulatory discretion (Gallemore, 2014; Liu and Ngo, 2014) . Therefore, we do not rely solely on failure as a proxy for a troubled bank, but also include more objective measures, namely LargeLLP and LargeLoss, which do not involve regulatory discretion. We use robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity.
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The remainder of the control variables in (2) and (3) are based on Jin, Kanagaretnam, and Lobo (2013) . Size, Tier1, and regional dummies were previously defined for (1). We control for the size of a bank's loan portfolio with Loans, the natural log of net loans and leases. Liquidity equals the ratio of deposits to total assets. We expect banks with greater liquidity to be less likely to become troubled. We control for a bank's loan quality with Allow and ChargeOff, which equal the ratios of loan loss reserve to assets and total charge-offs to assets. We expect banks with poorer loan quality to be more likely to become troubled. We control for a bank's loan portfolio characteristics by including LoanDiverse, REGrow, and CommercialGrow. LoanDiverse equals the Herfindahl Index of a bank's loan portfolio, calculated as the sum of squared percentages of total loans held in each loan category listed in their Call Report. REGrow (CommercialGrow) is the percent increase in real estate (commercial and industrial) loans. We expect banks that are less diversified and experiencing greater loan growth to be more likely to become troubled. Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the S-corporation and C-corporation bank observations. S-corporations represent approximately 28 percent of bank-years in our sample. We find that for each of the three risk measures -σ (ROA), σ (Net Interest), 18 Given that we only have one observation per firm and measure all independent variables in a single year (2007), clustering standard errors by firm or by year is not appropriate (Petersen, 2009 ).
IV. RESULTS
and Z-Score -S-corporation banks exhibit significantly less risk compared to C-corporation banks. Univariate tests also suggest that S-corporation banks are different from C-corporation banks along a variety of dimensions. We include these variables in our regression models to control for basic differences between S-corporation and C-corporation banks. Table 2 reports the results of difference-in-differences tests examining the association between S-corporation bank organizational form and risk-taking. The coefficient on SBank is negative and significant ( p < 0.01) using σ (ROA), σ (Net Interest), and Z-Score, suggesting that, on average, banks that adopt the S-corporation organizational form tend to be less risky compared to banks that remain C-corporations throughout the sample period. Including SBank in the regression allows us to hold constant timeinvariant bank attributes of banks that adopt the S-corporation organizational form during the sample period. The coefficient on PostS is negative and significant ( p < 0.01) using each of the risk proxies, suggesting that after adopting the S-corporation organizational form, banks exhibit incrementally less risk-taking behavior. These results are consistent with the organizational restrictions of S-corporations that likely induce external capital constraints and relatively greater shareholder monitoring efforts of S-corporation banks mitigating risk-taking behaviors.
19 Table 3 reports the results of the tests examining extreme adverse outcomes related to risk-taking. In Panel A, we present summary statistics of the sample as of 2006, the period preceding the start of the financial crisis. Of note, we find that C-corporation banks have a higher failure rate, and a higher rate of large loan loss provisions and large losses. Table 4 reports the results of the bivariate probit system of equations examining the association between troubled banks in the financial crisis (LargeLLP, LargeLoss, and Fail) and S-corporation organizational form. For each of these analyses, we report the S-corporation selection model in the first column and the extreme adverse outcome in the second column. In all three regressions, we find similar results for the selection model. Specifically, we find that smaller, less capitalized banks are more likely to be associated with the S-corporation status (p < 0.01). We also find that banks with greater dividends and that hold a smaller proportion of securities subject to alternative minimum tax are positively related to S-corporation organizational form ( p < 0.01).
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For both the LargeLLP and LargeLoss analyses, we find that the coefficient on SBank 06 is negative and significant ( p < 0.05), indicating that after controlling for the non-random decision to elect the S-corporation organizational form, S-corporation banks are significantly less likely to experience extreme adverse outcomes in the form of large losses and large loan loss provisions. However, we find that the coefficient on SBank 06 is insignificant ( p > 0.10) in the failure model; thus, we fail to find evidence consistent with S-corporation banks being more or less likely to fail compared to C-corporation banks. Bank failure is distinct from other extreme adverse outcomes (e.g., large losses and large provisions) in that bright line capital thresholds contribute to regulators' decisions regarding whether a bank fails. Given the abrupt economic downturn during the financial crisis, it is possible that when it comes to bank failure, S-corporations' comparative disadvantage relative to C-corporations in raising external capital offset some of the benefits of S-corporations being associated with less risk-taking. 
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V. ROBUSTNESS TESTS
A. Evidence of Capital Constraints
Consistent with Stulz's (2014) risk capital arguments, our results potentially reflect external capital constraints inducing S-corporations to pursue less risk-taking compared to C-corporations. To further explore this possibility, we examine whether S-corporations hold less capital or issue less equity in response to risk using a model adapted from Bushman, Hendricks, and Williams (2014) . 21 In untabulated, cross-sectional analysis, we find that S-corporations have significantly lower Tier 1 capital ratios and issue significantly less equity compared to C-corporations. Moreover, when we interact SElection with σ(ROA) or σ(Net Interest), we find that S-corporation banks have significantly lower Tier 1 capital ratios and issue significantly less equity for a given level of risk. While S-corporations typically enjoy a comparative advantage in retaining internally-generated funds compared to C-corporations (by virtue of no entity-level federal income tax), tax law likely constrains S-corporations' access to external capital.
B. Risk-Taking
We note that bank deregulation during our sample period potentially led to increased competition that spurred risk-taking (Bushman, Hendricks, and Williams, 2014) . To the extent that S-corporation conversions are also increasing over time, we potentially misattribute our findings to S-corporation organizational form rather than competition. Moreover, prior research suggests that competitive pressures are associated with the incidence of S-corporation elections among banks and suggests that S-corporation density potentially influences bank behavior (Donohoe, Lisowsky, and Mayberry, 2015; Mehran and Suher, 2009) . To assess the effects of potential differences in the competitive environments in which banks operate, we re-estimate our risk-taking tests after including three additional variables, StateHHI, Rural, and StateSShr, which capture competition. 22 In untabulated tests, we find evidence that more concentrated state banking markets and rural counties are negatively related to bank risk-taking. We also find that S-corporation prevalence in a state is negatively related to risk-taking. More importantly, our coefficients of interest have the same sign and significance level after controlling for these additional variables.
23 21 More specifically, we regress future Tier 1 capital ratios (equity issuances scaled by Tier 1 capital) on an indicator variable for S-corporation status (SElection) and the control variables (1) with the exception that we omit the Tier 1 capital ratio as an independent variable. SElection equals one for banks that are chartered as S-corporations (i.e., de novo) as well as for banks after they convert into S-corporation status.
We also interact SElection with five-year historical values of σ(ROA) or σ(Net Interest). We do not interact SElection with ZScore because it is mechanically related to capital. 22 All variables are defined in the Appendix. 23 We also consider the possibility that firms may consider conversion several years in advance of the actual conversion. In untabulated tests, we limit the risk-taking models to observations in the three years preceding or following conversion and find qualitatively similar results (i.e., the coefficient on PostS remains negative and significant in each model, p < 0.01).
We also control for pre-existing levels of bank risk-taking before conversion into S-corporation organizational form, as pre-conversion differences might not be fully captured using a difference-in-differences research design. We estimate model (1) using a propensity score matched sample based on size and lagged risk using a one-toone process and a caliper distance equal to 25 percent of the standard deviation of the propensity score (Guo and Fraser, 2015) . For example, when the dependent variable is future σ (ROA), we match S-banks to C-banks on size and lagged σ (ROA). We continue to find negative and significant coefficients on PostS, consistent with pre-conversion levels of risk not influencing our inferences.
C. Extreme Adverse Outcome Tests
It is possible that S-corporation organizational restrictions become so costly that the bank simply revokes its S-election and thereby increases its potential shareholder base to enhance access to external capital. However, for many banks, revoking the S-election can be both difficult and costly. In particular, it requires a majority of shareholders to voluntarily revoke an S-election. Moreover, even if a bank is able to obtain the necessary votes from its shareholders, there are potentially significant tax costs linked to S-corporation revocations because the bank typically cannot re-convert to the S-corporation organizational form for at least five years following the revocation, during which time the bank will be subject to double federal taxation. Moreover, even if an S-corporation decides to abruptly terminate its S-election amid a sharp downturn in the economy (e.g., the financial crisis), it begins with both a relatively smaller shareholder base from which to raise funds and it will have no comparative advantage relative to other C-corporations in raising capital from new shareholders during a time in which investors are likely to be reluctant to invest in banks needing to raise capital. Inferences are unchanged when we include observations for banks that converted or revoked S-corporation status during the financial crisis. Of these 171 observations, we have valid control variables for 170. We continue to find negative and significant coefficients for the LargeLLP and LargeLoss models.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this study, we examine the real effects of tax-motivated choices of organizational form, focusing on the relation between S-corporation versus C-corporation status and banks' risk-taking behaviors and the incidence of extreme adverse outcomes. Our results are consistent with S-corporations being associated with significantly lower risk-taking compared to C-corporation banks and suggest that limited access to capital and increased shareholder monitoring discourages risk-taking. We also find that S-corporation banks are less likely to experience extreme adverse outcomes in the form of large losses and large loan loss provisions relative to C-corporation banks. However, we do not find evidence that S-corporation banks are less likely to fail during the financial crisis. Our study is useful to policy makers and regulators as they weigh alternatives to improve bank safety and soundness.
